Abstract-Reliability is a very important specification for an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). The higher reliability can bring the shorter stop-working time and the lower maintenance cost. For a new AUV, reliability needs to be considered in advance during system design stage. This paper proposes a fault tree method for reliability analysis of the 4500m AUV. Firstly a fault tree model and its qualitative analysis are presented to determine the AUV's bottlenecks. Then the reliability is demonstrated by the Monte Carlo simulation. Finally some experiences are discussed to improve the AUV's reliability.
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Autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) is an automatic machine working autonomously without human intervention in underwater environment. It contains hundreds of components. Each component may fail unpredictably or even cause the AUV not to work. So it is strict on AUV's reliability because of high expense for field trial and actual application. Reliability is a very important specification in designing a new heavy weight or large AUV. It needs to make a balance among cost, performance and maintenance. Reliability analysis method includes fault tree analysis (FTA), fault mode effect and compromise analysis (FMECA) and event tree analysis (ETA). Fault tree analysis is mainly used to find the basic causes in leading to the unexpected system failures or damaging danger events and became a common tool for fault diagnosis and reliability assessment.
Jia Zhe et al. built the fault-tree model of Dongfeng autonomous mobile robot based on the related theory of FTA and found out the checklists of faults for the timely and effective clearing faults [1] . Wang Gaiyun utilized FTA for the fault diagnosis of welding robots and gave its qualitative and quantitative analysis to improve the efficiency of diagnosis and reliability analysis [2] . For an AUV system, Bian Xinqian carried out an AUV's fault tree and simulation model by combining FTA with Monte Carlo random sampling method [3] . Li Guoqi presented a FTA based method to evaluate runtime reliability in system level for an unmanned autonomous vehicle [4] . Cui Ying developed a database system combining with the remote monitoring, expert system, and intelligence diagnosis functions for crane and established the knowledge base with the aid of FTA [5] . Zheng Yanyi developed a fault tree automotive generation system based on decision lists [6] . Refaul Ferdous presented a methodology for a fuzzy based computer-aided fault tree analysis tool [7] . K. Durda Rao proposed a dynamic fault tree approach using Monte Carlo simulation in probabilistic safety assessment [8] .
This paper uses traditional fault tree method for reliability analysis of the 4500m AUV. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to the AUV and its components. Section 3 conducts the AUV's fault tree model and qualitative analysis. In the following the reliability is demonstrated by Monte Carlo simulation, which shows that system design can meet the demands of reliability specification. Finally, some experiences are discussed to improve the AUV's reliability.
I. THE 4500M AUV
The 4500m AUV is a shorter form of the deep-sea minerals autonomous exploration system, which is a 4500m rated AUV designed by Shenyang Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences. It is equipped with many sensors including a magnetometer, side-scan sonar, a camera, CTD and a turbidimeter. The 4500m AUV will be mainly used to explore the polymetallic sulfide minerals in deep-sea hydrothermal area. The AUV system is divided into six subsystems: carrier structure, control, navigation, power and propulsion, acoustics, and detection. The whole system is composed of hundreds of components. Each component's failure may lead to failure of its mission. So the reliability methods are necessary to grasp the bottlenecks of the whole system and take some corresponding improving measures in design and production. At the same time the methods can determine the breakdown reasons and direct the AUV's online fault diagnosis and autonomy decision.
II. FAULT TREE MODEL AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

A. Fault Tree Model
The 4500m AUV belongs to one of the complex systems. It is a complex process to assess the system state is normal or not. This paper firstly presents an AUV's fault tree model based on FTA shown as Fig. 1 . The model maps the logic causation among the system failure and the components faults, external events, or the combination of them. This fault tree is divided into four levels. The top level has one event, the system failure of the 4500m AUV, namely its mission is abort. The middle events of the second level include the autonomous control fault, the obstacle avoidance and detection fault, and the emergency operation fault. The middle events of the third level include the navigation unit fault, the control unit fault, the propulsion unit fault, the battery unit fault and the body equipment fault. The events of the fourth level include the inertial navigation system (INS) fault, the Doppler velocity log (DVL) fault, the long baseline (LBL) fault, the leaking fault, the gyro fault and so on. Each middle events of the fourth level can be further decomposed into bottom events. The bottom events of this fault tree are totaled more than 110 such as the INS power switch fault, the INS communication fault, the navigation unit's branch box leaking fault and so on.
B. Qualitative Analysis
The above fault tree is analyzed incompletely and need to further subdivide into bottom events for qualitative analysis. Taking the body equipment fault for example, its fault tree is shown in Fig. 2 and its symbols are explained in table I. The fault mode of a fault tree can be expressed by minimal cut sets. The destination of qualitative analysis is to determine the whole minimal cut sets.
The qualitative analysis process mainly includes:
Step 1: operate the built fault tree with standardization, simplification and modularization methods.
Step 2: calculate all of the minimal cut sets with down-totop or top-to-down according to the fault tree structure.
Step3: decompose the "modular minimal cut set" into "bottom-event minimal cut set" for qualitative importance comparison of the bottom events.
Step4: On the base of the whole minimal cut set C 1 , C 2 , … , C r , the top-level event can be denoted by: The minimal cut set of the body equipment fault is: {E 1 F 1 }, {E 1 F 2 }, {F 3 }, {F 4 }, {G 1 E 2 }, {G 2 E 3 }, {G 3 E 3 }, {G 4 E 3 }, {G 5 E 3 }, {D 22 }. When the bottom-level event probability and the difference are relatively small, the minimal cut set of the lower level is more important. The events in the low-order minimal cut sets are more important than that in the high-order minimal cut sets. Under the same order of minimal cut set condition the bottom event is more important if its appearance times are more frequently in different minimal cut sets. So we can see that the event E 3 is more important than the others in the above fault tree. The power switch fault of altimeter F2
The communication fault of altimeter E1
The CTD fault with multiple reset failure F3
The power switch fault of acoustic modem F4
Acoustic modem without response F5
The leaking fault of side-scan sonar F6
The side-scan sonar fault E2
The fault continues for one second E3 failed in turn off and reset for many times G1
The electronic cabin leaking fault of side-scan sonar G2
The control fault of the acoustic cabin power switch G3
The acoustic cabin power switch fault G4
The communication fault of the acoustic cabin G5
The internal fault of side-scan sonar
III. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
A. Reliability Analysis
The following is focused on quantitative reliability analysis of the AUV system. At the same time the indexes of the system reliability can be calculated, the modeling and simulation can be done. When analyze the reliability, we mainly focus on three indexes of the system, namely the index ) (t R s , the failure probability ) (t s λ , and the mean time between failures (MTBF).
As can be known from above, the AUV system is a complex combination of machinery and electricity. Once damaged, the basic components cannot be fixed in the runtime. As the fault of each basic component is one of the minimum segmentation of the system faults, and the basic component failures are all independent of each other, the system can be regarded as a series one. Thus any failure of the basic components will result in the system failure.
Supposed that
are the service lives of the n basic components, then the lifetime of the system is:
And then the system reliability is:
The failures of basic components are independent on each other, so the reliability is:
Then it is:
represents the reliability of the i th basic component. For the system in this study, the formula
is a constant value, so the reliability can be:
Then the failure probability of the system is:
The MTBF can be calculated by the formula:
From the above analysis, it can be concluded that the AUV system is a series one which is constituted of components whose lifetime is exponential distribution, and the service time of the AUV system can be regarded as a component whose service life obey the same distribution. And the failure rate of the system is the sum of the failure rates of all the basic components.
B. Simulation Process
To fulfill the simulation, a simulation method need to be chosen at first to get an estimation of the service time of the system, and then repeat the test many times to get a sample of the estimations of the system's lifetime. Finally using the statistical method to analysis the sample, we can calculate the MTBF of the system, and evaluate its reliability. So there are two important parameters need to be set properly, namely the maximum simulation time and the times of simulation. The setting of them is illustrated later.
For each simulation, we need to get the failure time of each component first. Monte Carlo method is taken to random samples of the failure times of n basic components, and we can obtain a simple sample of n basic components' lifetime. From the results above, the failure of basic components obey the distribution of indexes, and the character parameters can be gotten by accessing to relevant data, and combing with our actual situation. The parameters are shown in table II. Based on the known failure rate, the expected lifetime of the i th basic component is:
In the equation： In order to get the samples, we need to get a group of random numbers in the range of 0 and 1 at first, and these numbers are defined as i r . Then calculate in (12) with the known parameters i λ and i r , we can get the failure time of the i th component. Repeated this process, we can get all the failure times of the 38 components.
According to the simple sample of the basic components' lifetime, we can get an estimation of the system's lifetime in each simulation. Analyzing the fault tree, and we can find out that the failure of any component will result in the failure of the system. So in the j th simulation, the estimation of the system's lifetime is: Sorting the failure time of all the basic components, we should take the minimum of them as the failure time of the system in this simulation. If the expected time is larger than the maximum simulation time, the maximum simulation time is considered as the failure time of the system. Based on the proper simulation time, we can ensure that this situation will happen really rarely, and this approximate treatment will not lead to a distortion of the simulation result.
Repeat the above process for m times, and we will get m life estimations of the system.
Use interval statistics to process the m data. Setting the maximum simulation time as max T , and divide it into k. Then estimate ) ( r T m , which represents the number of times for j T fell into ) ,
Based on the simulation results, the index of the reliability is calculated.
The mean-time-between-failure, namely MTBF：
For in the range of
is very small, so the equation can be approximated as：
When MTBF is gotten, we can get s λ according to (10). So the reliability of the system at t is:
Failure rate of the system is ) (t
The number of simulation times, namely m, should not be too small; otherwise the accuracy of simulation result will be too low to ensure the result is convergent. But if m is too big, it will prolong the simulation time. After many times of test, it turned out that 1000 is the proper number. max T , the maximum simulation time, should cover the estimations of the system's lifetime. Analyzing the performance of all the basic components, we find out that LBL system has the shortest life expectancy, which is 769 hours. So basically, j T is inside 1000 hours, and we set max T as 1000.
Setting k as 10, the simulation result can meet the requirement.
According to the method, we carry out the simulate running. The simulating program flow chart is Fig. 3 . 
C. Result of Simulation
After simulating for 1000 times, MTBF of the AUV is 180 hours. Compared to the designed runtime which is 100 hours, we can make sure that the system design satisfies its reliability requirement. The vehicle is designed to work for 30 hours, and at most 10 hours can be added in case of emergency, so it will be 40 hours in total. We evaluated its possibility for working for 40 hours continually, and the result is 0.8007, which is big enough for such a vehicle. At last, we draw the reliability distribution, as is shown in Fig. 4 , and the distribution of failure probability, as is shown in Fig. 5 . With their help, we can evaluate the vehicle's reliability at anytime within 1000 hours. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Through qualitative and quantitative analysis we can make a conclusion that the 4500m AUV design can satisfy its reliability requirement. there are some experiences to discuss, including: 1) considering the AUV easy to use and easy to operate in software and structure design and improve design reliability; 2) take the software process control independently and testing fully for a long time to ensure the robustness of the software; 3) employ mature technology, off -the-shelf components and simpler structure for easy maintenance; 4) add appropriate redundancy and independent emergency unit for the AUV's safety.
